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Procedure - Foreign Corporations - Service of Process
on Sub-Subsidiary
Plaintiff, an El Salvador corporation, brought suit against Rolls Royce
of England, Ltd., the manufacturer of the engines on plaintiff's aircraft,
to recover for damages to the plane as a result of a crash in Nicaragua.
Service of process on Rolls Royce of England was made by serving sum-
mons on an officer of its sub-subsidiary corporation, Rolls Royce, Inc.,
which was chartered in Delaware. Its stock was wholly owned by Rolls
Royce of Canada, Ltd., whose stock was wholly owned by Rolls Royce of
England. Rolls Royce of Canada, the actual parent corporation of Rolls
Royce, Inc., was not a party to the present suit. Only Rolls Royce, Inc. was
licensed to do business in New York, and apparently neither Rolls Royce
of Canada nor Rolls Royce of England had any contacts or conducted
any business within the state which would subject them to suit except
through Rolls Royce, Inc. The New York trial court found that service
of summons on an officer of Rolls Royce, Inc. was not sufficient to render
Rolls Royce of England amenable to suit.1 The Appellate Division reversed
the trial court's decision by a two-to-one vote, and Rolls Royce of Eng-
land appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. Held: Service of process
on an officer of Rolls Royce, Inc. was sufficient to subject Rolls Royce of
England, Ltd. to the jurisdiction of the New York court. Taca Int'l Air-
lines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce of Eng., Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 256 N.Y.S.2d
129, 204 N.E.2d 329 (1965).
Where the corporation is licensed to do business within the state there
is no problem with service of process and jurisdiction. Most states require
the appointment of an agent as one of the prerequisites to licensing. a
When dealing with unauthorized foreign corporations,4 service may be
made under an applicable "long-arm" statute' or by service on its agent
'Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce of Eng., Ltd., No. 19962, Sup. Ct. of N.Y., 1st
Jud. Dist., 1961.
'Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce of Eng., Ltd., 21 App. Div. 2d 73, 248 N.Y.S.2d
273, resettled, 252 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1964). The dissenting judge stated that the trial court's findings
justified its holding that Rolls Royce, Inc. maintained complete separateness and independence from
Rolls Royce of England, Ltd. 248 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
a See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 6403 (e).
' An unauthorized foreign corporation is one which has not complied with the forum state's
licensing statute, and is not authorized to do business within the state.
'Usually the secretary of state is deemed the appointed agent of the corporation under these
statutes. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031 (b), § 3 (1964).
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doing business within the state The trouble here is whether the un-
authorized corporation has a business agent (one not expressly authorized
to receive service of process) within the state at all, and whether the
necessary minimal contacts exist with the forum state to satisfy a concept
of fair play and substantial justice which is the due process requirement
set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington7 and subsequent cases.
Only if this requirement of due process is met is the corporation amenable
to suit. Whatever method of service of process is used, it must be the best
possible means available which will give notice to the corporation of the
pending suit.' A special problem arises when the possible contact with the
state is a subsidiary of the foreign parent corporation. Earlier Supreme
Court cases,9 not overruled by International Shoe, prevent application of
its rule of minimal contacts as a criteria for service of process, to gain
jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation, because the acts of the
subsidiary are presumed not to be those of the parent." The test for de-
termining the question of jurisdiction over a parent corporation by serv-
ing summons on a subsidiary doing business within a state differs from
the tests for tort liability of the parent corporation, liability for taxes, or
for submission to the regulatory statutes of a state. The basis for this
differentiation is that a determination of jurisdiction does not affect the
substantive rights of the parties, but merely requires suit in another juris-
diction, a matter which turns on considerations of "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice," and "an estimate of the inconven-
iences ... ""
The leading case in the area of parent-subsidiary relationships, so far
as jurisdictional issues are concerned, is Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Pack-
ing Co." There the Supreme Court stated the rule that complete owner-
ship and domination of the subsidiary corporation were not sufficient con-
e In the present case, the New York Court of Appeals found that Rolls Royce, Inc., a licensed
corporation, was an agent of its parent. See N.Y. Civ, Prac. § 302 (a) (1): "A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domicilary . . . if, in person or through an agent, he: (1) trans-
acts any business within the state .... "
" 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950):
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."
. . . This right to be heard has little reality of worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending. . . . An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
• . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. . . . But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually in-
forming the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
o E.g., Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917);
Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907).
'0 See cases cited note 9 supra. The presumption is rebuttable. See notes 13-15 infra.
"t International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 7, at 316-17. See Cannon Mfg. Co., supra
note 9, at 337; American Chain Co. v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp., 56 F.2d 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); LaVarre v. International Paper Co., 37 F.2d 141 (E.D.S.C. 1929). See also Ballantine, Cor-
porations § 140 (Rev. ed. 1946). If a corporation has sufficient contact with a state to be covered
by the state's regulatory statutes and presumably its tax statute, it probably will be subject to service
of process in that state. See C. T. System Publication, Three Kinds of Doing Business 1-2 (Doing
Business Series 1965).
2267 U.S. 333 (1925).
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tacts with a state to subject the parent to the jurisdiction of a state court
so long as the separate corporate structure of the subsidiary was observed
in all respects."l Under this doctrine many courts have held that corporate
operations through a subsidiary did not necessarily constitute doing busi-
ness within a state, so as to render the parent amenable to suit by serving
summons on its subsidiary. 4 Only when a court determines that the acts
of the subsidiary are in reality those of the parent does the doctrine of
International Shoe come into effect." Before a court will hold that juris-
diction may be asserted over the parent by serving summons on the sub-
sidiary, it must be shown that the two corporations are not in fact distinct
entities, with each transacting business on its own behalf.
Where the courts have followed Cannon and refused to look beyond
the form of corporate separation, the parent has escaped the jurisdiction
of the court."' Thus, a foreign corporation is not regarded as doing busi-
ness within a state merely because its products are sold through a sub-
sidiary as long as it is done by the subsidiary as an independent enterprise."
Eight years after Cannon, the Supreme Court, in Consolidated Textile
Corp. v. Gregory,'9 held that a foreign parent was not amenable to suit,
even though its wholly owned subsidiary was the instrumentality used to
market its products in the state, if corporate separation was maintained
and the subsidiary did not act as an agent. It has also been held that a
foreign parent was not doing business merely because it supplied the
means for carrying on the business of the subsidiary."' Some courts have
'3Id. at 337: "The corporate separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real. It was not
pure fiction." The separation mentioned in Cannon was that the two corporations, one the parent/
manufacturer and the other, the subsidiary/distributor and seller, meticulously maintained separate
books, and that both were financially independent of the other, at least in form.
'" See, e.g., Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, supra note 9; Gravely Motor Plow & Culti-
vator Co. v. H. V. Carter Co., 193 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1951); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F.
Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960); State St. Trust Co. v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 144 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Anderson v. British Overseas Airways
Corp., 144 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Shedd v. Willys Motors, 143 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 142 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 44 (2d
Cir. 1957); LaVarre v. International Paper Co., supra note 11; Zimmers v. Dodge Bros., 21 F.2d
152 (N.D. I1. 1927); Vaughn Motors, Inc. v. Societe Anonyme Des Automobiles Peugeot, 30
Misc.2d 1047, 220 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Rosario v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp.,
270 App. Div. 169, 59 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1945).
"Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962); Harris v. Deere & Co., 223
F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950); Lawlor v. National Screen Corp., 10 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1950). But see Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964),
suggesting that ownership of a subsidiary corporation is one contact, not sufficient in itself, with the
state to be taken along with others as a means of determining minimal contacts under the doctrine
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
" Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., supra note 14.
" See, e.g., Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, supra note 9; Harris v. Deere & Co., supra
note 15; Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1950). See
cases cited notes 13-15 supra.
is Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, supra note 9; Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 12; Bank
of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Vaughn Motors, Inc. v. Societe
Anonyme Des Automobiles Peugeot, supra note 14.
1'289 U.S. 85 (1933).
2
0 Id. at 88.
" Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibben, supra note 9; Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., supra
note 9; Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).
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felt bound by the Cannon case, even though the result seemed inequitable.
In Harris v. Deere & Co.,2 2 the court stated:
The fiction of different corporate entities ought not to permit the manu-
facturer, in such case, to avoid suit in the states where its product is being
sold and where the wholly owned and controlled subsidiary is representing
it just as truly as if it were an agent in the legal sense. . ..
However, it was held that Cannon was controlling and the parent was
not amenable to suit. Other courts and several writers have also expressed
dislike for the rule of the Cannon case.'
Various courts have held that service of process on a subsidiary was
sufficient to subject a foreign parent corporation to their jurisdiction when
the subsidiary was found to be an agent of the parent, s or that the parent
and subsidiary had not maintained their separate corporate entities" -
that the subsidiary had no separate existence and was no more than a
department, instrumentality, business conduit, or bookkeeping entry for
the parent,"1 or was undercapitalized. Other courts, using criteria expressly
rejected by the Court in Cannon,"9 have held the parent subject to suit on
the basis of an "undue degree of control."" In all these cases the courts
have looked beyond form and have gone to the substance of the corporate
structure,"' although some cases have purported to look only at form.2
The question presented in all of these cases was whether the business done
in the state by the subsidiary was for its own account or that of the
parent.2 It is only where the corporations have commingled their affairs
22223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955).
23Id. at 163.
' See, e.g., Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, supra note 15; Steinway v. Majestic
Amusement Co., supra note 15; Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1949), amended and aff'd, 224 F.2d 80 (6th
Cir. 1955); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 522,
563; Comment, 104 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 381 (1955). See note 51 infra.
25 See, e.g., In re Siemens & Halske A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bator v. Boosey
& Hawkes, 80 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Sub-
sidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12, 18 (1925) where he states:
What is meant by such terms as "adjunct," "agency," "instrumentality, .... creature"
or "mouthpiece"? .. .The word "agency" is often used as a synonym of "adjunct,"
whatever that may mean, and as descriptive of a relation variously defined in the cases
as "alter ego," "alias," "device," "dummy," "branch," "tool," "corporate double,"
"business conduit," "instrumentality," etc., but all in the sense of "means" through
which a corporation's own business is actively prosecuted.
' See, e.g., United States v. Buffalo Weaving & Belting Co., 155 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Gray v. Eastman Kodak Co., 53 F.2d 864 (E.D. Pa. 1930); State ex rel Grinnell Co. v. MacPherson,
62 N.M. 308, 309 P.2d 981, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 825 (1957).
27 See, e.g., Massey-Harris-Ferguson, Ltd. v. Boyd, 242 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 806 (1957) (instrumentality or adjunct); Mas v. Orange-Crush Co., 99 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1938) (bookkeeping entry).
" See Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Fraser Corp., 198 Misc. 707, 96 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
afl'd, 278 App. Div. 584, 102 N.Y.S.2d 815, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 892, 100 N.E.2d 177 (1951). See
also note 40 infra.
2
9See note 13 supra.
'
4 See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., v. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co., 325 F.2d 713, 714
(10th Cir. 1963): "[T]he appellant Canadian corporation was enabled to and did direct 'the
detailed activities of . . . [its subsidiary].' "
2" See, e.g., Massey-Harris-Ferguson, Ltd. v. Boyd, supra note 27; Focht v. Southwestern Sky-
ways, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964).
a See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, supra note 15.
33See Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948); Commonwealth
ex eel Hawkins v. Southern Ry., 193 Ky. 474, 237 S.W. 11 (1921), stating that the question is
one of who is doing the business rather than one of what constitutes doing business.
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and the subsidiary is in fact no more than an agent or business conduit
of the parent, or where the parent so controls the subsidiary that it may
be used as an agent or instrumentality' that the courts will disregard
corporate form and prevent it from acting as a bar to direct suit against
the parent. 5 This is done, for example, where the subsidiary has obvi-
ously surrendered its freedom of corporate action in regard to matters
usually and lawfully within its control."6
In Taca the Appellate Division held that Rolls Royce, Inc. was a mere
department of Rolls Royce of England, acting as its exclusive sales agent
in the United States. 7 The court, in its opinion, did nothing more than
list the various facts on which it based its finding that Rolls Royce, Inc.
was an agent. The evidence only established the facts that Rolls Royce
of England owned the sub-subsidiary through its ownership of Rolls Royce
of Canada, had some directors in common with the sub-subsidiary, held
frequent conferences with the executives of the subsidiary and sub-
subsidiary, gave Rolls Royce, Inc.'s employees the necessary technical
training, furnished all sales literature, and that the net income of Inc.
went to Rolls Royce of Canada and, as affected by its operations, appeared
in the consolidated earnings statement and profit and loss statement of
Rolls Royce of England. It is submitted that no more than the exercise
of power which is consistent with corporate ownership was shown. Thus,
in form at least, Rolls Royce of England was not "doing business" in New
York, but was deriving economic benefit from the state through corporate
ownership of its sub-subsidiary, Rolls Royce, Inc. Under the doctrine of
Cannon and other cases, 8 this is not sufficient to establish that the two cor-
portions were not separate entities. Further, the Rabinowitz case," a
New York decision cited as controlling by the court, differs in two major
respects. First, it dealt with subsidiaries rather than a sub-subsidiary, the
control and direction of the subsidiary being more direct, at least in form.
Secondly, the subsidiaries were undercapitalized." In Rabinowitz the parent
manufactured automobiles and sold them to one of its subsidiaries, the sales
corporation, for which it was paid by the subsidiary. The plaintiff con-
tended, and the court found, that the parent and its four subsidiaries were
carrying on business as an integrated set-up and that the sales corporation
was an agent or department of the parent; that the sales corporation was
34 See, e.g., Gray v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra note 26; State ex rel Grinnell Co. v. MacPherson,
supra note 26 (parent and subsidiaries held themselves out as one in advertising).
3' See, e.g., Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., supra note 24; Pergament v. Frazer, supra note
24. But see Harris v. Deere & Co., supra note 22, expressing dislike but refusing to pierce the cor-
porate veil. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See generally, Comment, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 574
(1963).
'See, e.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490
(1918), in which joint parent corporations controlled the rates charged by their subsidiary, which
were in excess of their own line haul rates. A contract between the three of them deprived the
subsidiary's board of directors of normal legal control over its stock, finances, and business relations
with third parties.
3'256 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 204 N.E.2d at 330.
s See cases cited note 9 supra.
s Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., supra note 28.
40 Id. at 645. "[T]he value of the assets of the Sales Corporation [one of the subsidiaries] did
pot even equal the amount of the loan."
[Vol. 3 1
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dependent financially on the parent and could not stand on its own feet;
that the subsidiary had not been paying interest on advances totaling
seven million dollars made by the parent; that less than fifteen per cent
of the consolidated earnings and assets was attributed to all the subsidiaries
combined; that the subsidiary sales corporation never paid dividends;
that banks required the parent to guarantee repayment of loans made to
the subsidiary; that the two corporations had directors in common; and
that the parent paid the entire salary of the sales subsidiary's executive
officers who were also officers of the parent, and in a few cases one of the
subsidiaries had paid the entire salary of officers common to both. The
court found that this, in itself, showed disregard of corporate form by
the corporations themselves.4 In Taca there was a finding by the Appellate
Division that Rolls Royce, Inc. was independent in form," and no finding,
as in Rabinowitz, that it was undercapitalized or financially dependent on
its parent; no finding that Rolls Royce of England ever made its sub-
subsidiary loans without interest or had to guarantee repayment of any
bank loans made to Rolls Royce, Inc.; and no finding that the salaries of
their common directors were paid totally by only one of the two corpora-
tions. To hold that Rolls Royce, Inc. was an agent of Rolls Royce of Eng-
land for the purpose of service of process, the Court of Appeals should
have shown that the control exercised by Rolls Royce of England over
its sub-subsidiary was through contracts, financial domination, or other
means distinguishable from mere indicia of ownership.'
The only other reported case involving service of process on a sub-sub-
sidiary corporation, United Steelworkers of America v. Copperweld Steel
Co.," held that the parent corporation was not doing business within the
state so as to render it amenable to suit by serving summons on its sub-
subsidiary. The court directed its attention to the question of whether
the parent so controlled and dominated the sub-subsidiary as to deprive it
of a separate existence." Taca, therefore, is the first reported case where
service on a sub-subsidiary was held sufficient to bind the parent corpora-
tion. Further, the court relied to some extent upon transactions between
Rolls Royce of Canada and Rolls Royce, Inc. as grounds for sustaining
service."6 Ignoring the separate corporate form, the court considered the
realities of the corporate structure and found an integrated set-up from
41 Id. at 643-45.
4256 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 204 N.E.2d at 330: "Inc., though nominally independent, actually
functioned as a department of its British parent, Ltd. . . . [T]he claimed independence of Inc. was
illusory and . . . despite form and appearance Inc. was a mere sales agent of Ltd."
4' An excellent example of this procedure is Goodman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 1 Misc. 959,
148 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 2 App. Div. 2d 707, 153 N.Y.S.2d 600, motion for leave
to appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 781, 154 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1956). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Cassel, supra note 15.
44 230 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
43 Id. at 387-89. The court found that the corporations maintained their formal separation, and
while they had common directors the question was whether the sub-subsidiary was the alter-ego of
the parent. "[D]efendant Fulton the parent has not exercised such complete domination of the
financies, policies and business practices of . . . [its sub-subsidiary] so as to deprive it of a separate
existence." It should be pointed out that the wholly owned subsidiary owned only 48.45% of the
sub-subsidiary's common stock and 51% of its non-cumulative preferred stock.
46256 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32, 204 N.E.2d at 330-31.
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which Rolls Royce of England was doing business within the state."' In
so doing, the court went further than any previous court in "piercing the
corporate veil." The opinion that corporate separation should not act as a
bar to holding a foreign parent corporation to suit appears to be a step
closer to recognition. Possibly, the minimal contacts theory" will soon
apply in the area of parent-subsidiary relationships as in other areas of
doing business by a foreign corporation. The court expressly declined to
decide whether Rolls Royce of England could have been held to suit on
the basis of the minimal contacts theory. 9 However, ownership of a sub-
subsidiary, through which a parent is deriving economic benefit from the
state, should be sufficient to establish the necessary minimal contacts, even
though the contact is through an "independent" corporation doing busi-
ness within the jurisdiction." Under either the minimal contacts theory or
the rule followed in this case, the result would be the same. As a matter
of choice, the minimal contacts theory seems to be better." It has the ad-
vantage of avoiding conflict with the Cannon doctrine"2 and obviates the
necessity of paying "lip-service" to Cannon but ignoring its rule of formal
separation, while at the same time preserving the theory of corporate
entities." As it stands today each case will be determined on its own facts,"
and whether the corporation will be held amenable to suit will depend
4 Id. at 131, 204 N.E.2d at 330-31.
4' As embodied in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 7.
4"256 N.Y.S.2d at 132, 204 N.E.2d at 331: "Decision of this appeal does not require us to de-
cide whether . . .Ltd. treated as a corporation separate from Inc. has substantial enough contacts
with our State . . . to subject Ltd. to a judgment in personam."
5 At least Rolls Royce, Inc. was independent in form if not in substance. See note 42 supra.
" This sentiment has been expressed many times by courts and writers. See Velandra v. Regie
Nationale Des Usines Renault, supra note 15; Harris v. Deere & Co., supra note 22; Steinway v.
Majestic Amusement Co., supra note 15; Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., supra note 24; Perga-
ment v. Frazer, supra note 24; Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956
Wis. L. Rev. 522, 563; Comment, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 574 (1963). As stated in Waldron v. British
Petroleum Co. at 834-35:
Does the fact that this large business entity, for tax reasons . . . decides to fragmentize
its operations into . . . subsidiaries, make the resulting operations of the subsidiaries
any the less a part of transaction of business by . . . [the parent]? . . . [T]here is
no reason to carry the fiction to the extreme of saying that a corporation which has
a wholly owned subsidiary performing services in the local jurisdiction ... is in fact
not transacting business in that jurisdiction ...
And in Pergament v. Frazer at 12:
[T]he courts do not and should not encourage the creation of corporate empires which
have subsidiaries trading on the strength of the main organization's name . . . only
to have those who deal with . . . the subsidiaries, learn that when question of suit
arises it is necessary for the offended party to travel across the continent ...in order
to find a jurisdiction where his suit may be tried.
52 Compare Massey-Ferguson, Ltd. v. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co., supra note 30, with
Harris v. Deere & Co., supra note 51.
' Applying the minimal contacts theory to a parent-subsidiary situation would eliminate the
need to "pierce the corporate veil" as the parent has the necessary contact through its subsidiary.
See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, supra note 15, where the court advanced much
the same view as is advocated here. In the absence of a parent-subsidiary relationship, the criterion
to hold a foreign corporation to suit is the same. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958):
"[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." A parent corporation meets these requirements when its subsidiary
operates within the state.
"4National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965); United
Steelworkers of America v. Copperweld Steel Co., supra note 44; Focht v. Southwestern Skyways,
Inc., supra note 31.
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on whether the plaintiff has satisfied the court that the two corporations
are not in fact separate."
A. ]. Harper II
"Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., supra note 14; Dam v. General Elec. Co., 111
F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Wash. 1953). See also text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
Judgments -Collection of Interest Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act - Are Individual Awards Final Judgments?
Following an airplane collision over Maryland involving a government
aircraft, the survivors of the pilot and the survivors of the co-pilot
brought two separate actions against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.' The two suits were joined for trial and each group of
survivors received a judgment in excess of 100,000 dollars,' although
with one exception no individual survivor obtained an award in excess of
100,000 dollars.' No copies of the transcript of the judgments were filed
with the General Accounting Office as required to obtain interest on a
judgment under 31 U.S.C. § 724(a)." Instead, nine months later, plain-
tiffs, survivors of the pilot, brought suit for interest on the judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b), which applies to judgments in excess
of 100,000 dollars and does not require the filing of a judgment tran-
script.' Held: Each individual award within the judgment is a separate final
judgment for the purposes of interest and, therefore, is governed by 31
' Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
a The pilot of the National Guard plane was held to be a civilian "caretaker" and an employee
of the United States within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States v. Maryland
ex rel. Meyer, 322 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963). However, in a similar
case, Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965), the Supreme Court ruled that
a civilian caretaker was a state, rather than a federal employee. See Note, 31 J. Air L. & Com. 42
(1965).
'Mary Jane Meyer $85,000
Paul Jeffery Meyer $25,000
Susan Lynn Meyer $30,000
Pamela Ann Meyer $30,000
Vance Lewman Brady $175,000
Virginia Brady $35,000
Kendall Jesse Brady, Jr. $38,000
Austin F. Canfeld, administrator $2,000
475 Stat. 1526 (1961), 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1964):
There are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury . . . such sums as may on
and after July 27, 1956 be necessary for the payment, not otherwise provided for,
as certified by the Comptroller General, of judgments (not in excess of $100,000
in any one case) rendered by the district Courts and the Court of Claims against the
United States which have become final. . . . Provided, That, whenever a judgment
of a district court to which the provisions of section 2411 (b) of Title 28 apply,
is payable from this appropriation, interest shall be paid thereon only when such
judgment becomes final after review on appeal or petition by the United States,
and then only from the date of filing of the transcript thereof in the General Ac-
counting Office. . . . Provided further, That whenever a judgment rendered by the
Court of Claims is payable from this appropriation, interest payable thereon in ac-
cordance with section 2516 (b) of Title 28 shall be computed from the date of the
filing of the transcript thereof in the General Accounting Office.
'28 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) (1964):
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) of this section, on all final judgments
rendered against the United States in actions instituted under section 1346 of this
title, interest shall be computed at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from the
date of the judgment up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval
of an appropriation Act providing for payment of the judgment.
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U.S.C. § 724(a) rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2411 (b). United States v. Mary-
land ex rel. Meyer, 349 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The basis for an award of interest on a judgment, in the majority of
state jurisdictions, is statutory rather than common law! The sovereign
must give its consent to be sued' and the correlative proposition that the
sovereign must also consent to any award of interest follows. The Supreme
Court stated the well established maxim in Smyth v. United States8
that unless there is a statute to the contrary, interest may not be awarded
against the Government. The adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act
as a broad waiver of governmental immunity signaled the need for a
further waiver of immunity in the payment of interest. Subsequently, in
1948, Congress provided for the payment of interest on final judgments
against the United States.9 However, from the Government's standpoint,
28 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) presented an expensive and time consuming pro-
cedure with salient deficiencies. Three of the primary difficulties asso-
ciated with the statute were:"
1. The congressional process for passing appropriations to pay judg-
ments against the Government was sometimes dilatory and resulted in an
increased cost of interest to the United States and an inconvenience to the
successful litigant.
2. While the handling of requests for appropriations was routine, it
did absorb a certain amount of time.
3. There existed a wide variance between the payment of interest be-
tween the Court of Claims and the district courts."
For these reasons, Congress acted to simplify the collection of interest on
judgments against the Government by enacting 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) as
a modification of 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b). The important change made is
the requirement that a transcript of the judgment be filed before interest
will begin to run. However, because Congress did not wish to lose all
control over these appropriations, only those judgments which are "not
in excess of $100,000 in any one case" are payable from the separate
permanent appropriation.' 2 Those judgments in excess of 100,000 dollars
require no filing of a judgment transcript, and are to be paid by special
congressional appropriations, the interest being computed under the pro-
visions of 28 U.S.C. § 2411 (b).
The committee hearings which preceded the adoption of 31 U.S.C. §
5 Note, Interest on Verdicts and Judgments in State and Federal Courts, 38 Notre Dame Law.
58 (1962).
'Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
8302 U.S. 329 (1937).
'28 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1964), supra note 5.
'o Hearings on H. 400 Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 883-89 (1956).
" Interest was paid on judgments rendered by the Court of Claims only when the United States
appealed and a transcript of the judgment was filed with the Treasury Department. Interest was
paid on district court judgments from the date of the judgment regardless of whether the Govern-
ment appealed.
12 See note 10 supra. In referring to a previous proposal similar to 31 U.S.C. S 724(a) which
had been defeated, Mr. Rappaport, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Budget, in testimony before
the House Subcommittee on Appropriations said "it seems to indicate that the Congress is unwilling
to relinquish completely its control over appropriations for the payment of judgments."
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724(a) revealed that during the years 1954-1955, the largest number
of appropriation requests were derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act."
Except where the Federal Tort Claims Act specifically provides for a
deviation from state law, the liability of the Government is to be de-
termined by the substantive law of the state where the tort occurs. 4 In
wrongful death actions under the act, the courts have applied the re-
spective state statutes in determining the nature of the right created," the
basis for recovery,"0 the liability of the Government, 7 and the persons for
whose benefit the suit is brought." Further, the question of who must
bring the action also depends upon the substantive law of the state."
This means that state law governs both the form of the action and the
identity of the parties who are allowed to sue."° The Supreme Court has
stated that, "it seems sufficient to note that Congress has been specific in
those instances where it intended the federal courts to depart completely
from state law."" Since there is no federal statute defining a federal court
judgment in an action under the act, the logical conclusion would seem
to be that the federal courts would follow the respective state practice.
The majority of the states follow the general rule that there can be
only one final judgment in a case and it must dispose of the entire case
as to all the issues." A case is a judicial entirety which, when conducted to
a determination, results in a judgment." However, there may be numerous
separate and distinct causes of action contained in one case and, as one
court has pointed out, there is a recognizable difference between a case
and several causes of action incorporated in a case.' The joining of differ-
ent causes of action into one case is usually an advantagous procedure
both for the courts and a defendant who is subject to multiple claims.
It is important to note that piecemeal litigation of one cause of action
which could lead to several judgments and several executions is disfavored
in the federal courts." Perhaps for this reason one court held that a single
13Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, supra note 10, at 885.
"Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1951):
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.
15Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934).
1"Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
"Alaniz v. United States, 257 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1958).
" United States v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 227 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1955).
"Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Idaho 1957).
"oKaufman v. Service Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1956).
" Richards v. United States, supra note 14, at 16.
" Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); De Vally v. Kendall De Vally Opera-
logue Co., 220 Cal. 742, 32 P.2d 638 (1943). See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 65 (1947).
"North v. Hawkinson, 324 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1959).
'4Blaise v. Bovin, 173 Misc. 963, 18 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939).
"Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry Tent & Awning Co., 273 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1959).
For example: A has a fire insurance policy with B Company. A's house is destroyed by fire and he
claims his loss is $30,000. B offers to pay only $14,000. A is awarded $14,000 on a partial summary
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ruling containing separate and distinct sums does not create separate and
distinct judgments as to each sum." However, separate final judgments
may be proper in a multiple party or joinder of actions case. Freeman, in
his text on judgments, stated:
If several plaintiffs properly join, but their causes of action are separate
and distinct and their damages may be different, the judgment should not be
for an aggregate sum but should segregate and award to each the damages
or relief to which he is properly entitled."
However, he drew a distinction concerning judgments in a wrongful
death action because the amount recovered is considered to be a single
fund for the reimbursement of the damage suffered by the plaintiffs indi-
vidually. Since there is only one fund, there would be only one cause of
action. The few jurisdictions which have considered the question are in
agreement that the test used to determine if separate judgments are proper
is whether a separate action could have been maintained by each of the
plaintiffs." Thus, where the action is severed,29 where there is a permissive
joinder of two separate causes of action, 0 or where there is a consolidation
of two actions," it is recognized that separate judgments are proper and
may even be necessary. The case of United States v. Harue Hayashi"2
illustrated the application of a separate judgment situation. The wife and
children had permissively joined in a suit for a wrongful death, as per-
mitted by Hawaiian law. The children were individually awarded sums
less than 100,000 dollars, but which totaled over 100,000 dollars. The
Fiscal Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department requested an opinion
from the Comptroller General on the payment of the judgment. In his
reply, the Comptroller General recognized that each of the children
could have brought a separate action, and that any award less than 100,000
dollars was to be paid from the appropriation set up by 31 U.S.C. §
724 (a).3' Reliance was placed on the primary purpose of the appropriation
to promptly pay the judgments and thereby reduce the interest cost. The
Comptroller General did not consider whether a distinction should be
made between a permissive and compulsory joinder.
The action in the instant case was instituted under the Maryland
judgment, and an accompanying execution. B appeals, and while the appeal is pending, A receives
another judgment and execution for $16,000. It is obvious that there need have been only one
judgment and one execution.
2 Chicago Trust Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp., 58 F.2d 305, 312 (E.D. Ky. 1931).
27 Freeman, Judgments 175 (5th ed. 1925).2SBerry v. St. Louis & S.F.Ry., 118 Fed. 911 (C.C.D. Kan. 1902). Irwin v. Wood, 7 Colo. 477,
4 Pac. 783 (1884). Emmco Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 86 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
Caton v. Flig., 343 Il1. App. 99, 98 N.E.2d 162 (1951).
29 Kriser v. Rodgers, 195 App. Div. 394, 186 N.Y. Supp. 316 (1921).
' Lewis v. Bricker, 235 Mich. 656, 209 N.W. 832 (1926).
asFrankel v. Burke's Excavating, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
2rwin v. Wood, supra note 28. For example: A, while driving his car, strikes B, and also
C's parked car. If there were only one judgment in favor of B and C jointly, a reversal by the
appellate court of one cause of action would result in the whole judgment being reversed.
33 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960).
2440 Decs. Comp. Gen. 307, 308 (1960): "The primary purpose in establishing the appropria-
tion was to provide for the prompt payment of judgments and to thereby eliminate or greatly re-
duce the costs of interest thereon."
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Wrongful Death Statute which allows only one action to be brought.'
At the time the suit was commenced, the statute provided that "every such
[wrongful death] action shall be brought by and in the name of the
state of Maryland for the use of the person or persons entitled to dam-
ages." All parties seeking compensation must join together and failure to
do so bars any subsequent action." The statute creates only one cause of
action and one case which should culminate in one judgment. The pro-
cedure followed requires the jury to assess the total liability of the de-
fendant and then to apportion the amount recovered between the claim-
ing parties.8  However, unless the defendant can show that a failure to
apportion the damages has been to his detriment, it is not reversible error
for the jury to fail to do so. In the present case the district court ruled
that 31 U.S.C. § 724 (a) was not applicable to this action." Following the
previously discussed rules on judgments the court said that "the question
resolves itself into this: was the judgment involved in this case for less
or more than $100,000."'" The court reasoned that under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the nature of the action was governed by Maryland law,
and since Maryland permits only one action to be brought, there was only
one judgment containing individual awards. In reversing the trial court,
the court of appeals stated that "judgment 'in any one case' does not
necessarily mean in one law suit without regard to the character of the
judgment as it bears on the problem of interest."' The court reasoned
that 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) was to be applied in conformity with its own
purpose, and that Maryland's joinder requirement had no bearing on the
Government's liability for interest. Previous cases in which 31 U.S.C.
§ 724 (a) was considered had little or no bearing on the specific outcome
of the case, because they involved judgments below the 100,000 dollar
limit. For the purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 724(a), each individual award
was ruled a final judgment "in any one case." Although the majority
found that there were "no policy considerations which outweigh those
which operate in favor of the view we take,"" the dissent accepted the
" Md. Ann. Code art. 67, § 4 (Supp. 1964).
The amount so recovered [in a wrongful death action] shall be divided amongst
the above mentioned parties, in such shares as the jury by their verdict shall find and
direct; provided, that no more than one action shall be for and in respect of the same
subject matter of complaint ...
'"A 1962 amendment eliminated this provision requiring a wrongful death action to be brought
in the state's name. Md. Acts 1962, S. Bill 70, ch. 36, § 1.
87 State ex rel. Bashe v. Boyce, 72 Md. 140, 19 Atl. 366 (App. Div. 1890).
"SMaryland ex rel. Gaegler v. Thomas, 173 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1959). Many of the state
statutes provide that damages recovered in a wrongful death action are to be distributed by the
probate court according to the intestacy provisions, and not the court or jury that assesses the total
liability. See generally 16 Am. Jur. Death § 251 (1938).
"
5 Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915). Passapae v. Oehring, 141 Md. 60, 118
Atl. 130 (1922). Both courts felt that the only matter which concerns the defendant is his total
liability, not the share each claimant receives.
'Maryland ex rel. Meyer v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1964).
41Id. at 281.
42 349 F.2d at 695.
'Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); United States v. Jacobs, 308 F.2d 906 (5th
Cir. 1962).
44 349 F.2d at 696.
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reasoning of the district court relying primarily on 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)
and the fact that Maryland allowed only one action."
The effect of the majority decision is to interpret "judgment in any
one case" to mean in any individual award.
The congressional purpose behind 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) was to reduce
the cost of interest to the Government. The legislative history does not
indicate a desire to standardize the payment of interest among the states,
but the decision has that effect. The result of the case is to create a special
definition of "judgment" for the purpose of interest payments. To con-
sider each individual money award within a judgment to be a separate
and final judgment presents ramifications. The ruling may cause problems
in those jurisdictions which allow the probate court to apportion the
judgment."6 Until the probate court acts the claimants will not know the
extent of their award and will be unable to file a transcript of the judg-
ment. Delays will mean loss of interest. There may be cases in which it
will be beneficial for the parties to collect their judgment without the
necessity of a congressional appropriation," since the interest rate paid by
the Government is only four per cent as opposed to a higher commercial
rate. All things considered, the effect of the majority decision in interpret-
ing "judgment in any one case" to mean in any one individual award
serves as an exception to a generally accepted and proper rule of law.
James Knox Murphey III
4' Id. at 698.
4 See note 38 supra.
"'Brief for Appellant, p. 29, United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer, 349 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cu.
1965).
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Constitutional Law - Airport Zoning - Height Restrictions
In 1949, the City of Gary, Indiana, enacted an airport zoning ordi-
nance' prescribing certain height restrictions2 around the municipal air-
port. Subsequently, the Indiana Toll Road Commission constructed a
bridge approximately twelve feet in excess of the maximum height pre-
scribed by the ordinance.' The airport operators brought suit against the
Commission for injunctive relief and damages and although the injunction
was denied, damages were awarded by the trial court.! The Indiana Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the airspace above the land is a con-
stitutionally protected area and that the ordinance was unconstitutional as
it "purported to authorize an unconstitutional appropriation of property
rights without payment of compensation."' The decision was based on the
Indiana Constitution' and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, but the two constitutional provisions were not con-
sidered separately. The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari. ' Held: The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently
granted because the state ground was "an independent and adequate
ground of decision," thereby depriving the United States Supreme Court
of jurisdiction to review the decision! Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road
Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487(1965).
Height zoning restrictions have been recognized as a proper exercise of
the police power since the landmark case of Welch v. Swasey.9 Although
Welch was not an airport case, the Supreme Court held that in order for
the ordinance to be valid, it must have a reasonable relation to the pre-
' Gary, Ind., Ordinance 2897, 20 Sept. 1949. This ordinance is set forth in full in the petition-
ers' brief. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 4-6, Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487
(1965).
2 Id. at 5. "(c) Inner Area Approach Zone as indicated (extending 6,000 feet from the end of
the proposed runway) not to exceed height greater than permitted of 40 to I slope." This is com-
monly referred to as a 40 to 1 glide angle. The effect of this ratio is that no structure may exist
over one foot in height at a distance of forty feet from the end of the proposed runway, two feet
in height at eighty feet away, etc.
a The property in question was within the "Inner Area Approach Zone."
4 It is interesting to note that damages were awarded to the airport operators for a prospective
loss of business since the bridge had increased the glide angle on the north-south runway rendering
it unusable to aircraft in excess of 15,000 pounds.
' Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237, 242 (1963).
a Ind. Const. art. 1, § 21.
'Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 377 U.S. 942.
s In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Black, said that since the
question of airport zoning was such an important one with respect to the federal constitution, the
case should be remanded to the Indiana Supreme Court for a determination of whether the basis
of their decision was federal or state. The rationale was that if allowed to stand, this case should be
precedent for state courts becoming "the final arbiter of important issues under the federal consti-
tution" just by deciding the question on apparently commingled state and federal grounds. 379 U.S.
at 496.
9214 U.S. 91 (1909); see also Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949) for a good discussion of the
validity of height zoning.
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vention of undesirable conditions, and that these undesirable conditions
must be a proper subject of public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare. Since the turn of the century, most states have passed legislation
enabling cities and counties to prevent airport hazards and obstructions
through local zoning ordinances." Most of this state legislation was im-
plemented or induced by the Federal Airport Act11 and the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958.1" From these two acts, the Federal Aviation Agency
derives its authority to propose and annually revise a National Airport
Plan 3 designed to provide for a nationwide system of airports. To execute
this plan, Congress adopted a federal grant-in-aid program. In order to
receive federal funds, airport sponsors must assure the Administrator of
the FAA that future airport hazards will be prevented. 4 A recent amend-
ment to the Federal Airport Act recommends the use of zoning ordinances
where possible. 3 Many such ordinances, including the one in the instant
case, are patterned after the Model Airport Zoning Ordinance " authored
by the FAA.
Only a minority of cases have upheld the validity of height zoning with
respect to airports. In Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee
Airport Authority," a business establishment's ornamental roof extended
above the height limitation prescribed by the local ordinance. The excess
height was not shown to be essential to the operation of the business. The
Florida Supreme Court held that prohibiting the existence of the roof
above the minimum was a valid exercise of the police power and not a
"taking" of private property without just compensation. In Waring v.
Peterson," the ordinance so limited the height of structures on plaintiff's
10 For a partial list of these statutes and a discussion of a few, see Rhyne, Airports and the
Courts 171-76 (1944). See also 17 NIMLO Munic. L. Rev. 178 (1954), for analysis and recent
trends in provisions in airport zoning legislation.
11 60 Star. 170 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-20 (1964).
1272 Stat. 730 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1964).
"sNational Airport Plan, Requirements for Fiscal Years 1963-1967, 1963 Supplement, FAA
(March 1963).
14 Form FAA-1624, Part III 7, Sponsor Assurances:
Insofar as it is within its power and reasonably possible, the Sponsor will, either
by the acquisition and retention of easements or other interests in or rights for the
use of land or airspace or by the adoption and enforcement of zoning regulations,
prevent the construction, erection, alteration, or growth of any structure, tree or other
object in the approach areas of the runways of the Airport, which would constitute
an obstruction to air navigation according to the criteria or standards prescribed in
Section A of FAA Technical Standard Order No. N18, dated April 26, 1950, as
amended.
1 Federal Airport Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (1964), requires assurance to the Administrator that:
(4) appropriate action, including the adoption of zoning laws, has been or will be
taken, to the extent reasonable, to restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the im-
mediate vicinity of the airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal
airport operations including landing and take-off of aircraft.
"6 Model Airport Zoning Ordinance, July 1960, is set out in full in petitioner's brief. Brief for
Petitioners, pp. 27a-47a, Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
'"See, e.g., Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 160 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1963); Sneed v. County of
Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 310, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Waring v. Peterson,
137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1962); Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority,
111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575
(1942). For cases contra, see note 22 infra.
181ll So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
'9 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1962).
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land that it was suited only for agricultural purposes, which was the only
use to which plaintiff was putting the property at the time of the suit.
The Florida court said that as long as there was a beneficial use left to
the plaintiff, it did not have to be the most beneficial use to which the
land could be put. In a well-reasoned opinion, the Alabama Supreme
Court in Baggett v. City of Montgomery"° upheld a blanket height re-
striction of thirty-five feet within a two-mile radius of an airport as a
reasonable exercise of the police power. As grounds for upholding the
zoning ordinances, the courts have relied upon either: (1) public safety,
which includes prevention of obstructions and hazards around the air-
port; or (2) general welfare which includes protection of the airport in-
vestment by preventing construction which could render all or a part of
the airport useless; 1 or (3) a combination of the two. However, the
majority of the courts have held that the ordinances have authorized an
unconstitutional "taking" of private property rights without just com-
pensation." When the courts have failed to uphold the validity of height
zoning ordinances, the local governmental units have been forced to
acquire the fee to, or an avigation easement' over, such land as is necessary
to ensure the protection of the airport's glide paths."
Since the basic limitation on all types of zoning is reasonableness of the
ordinance with respect to a balancing of the individual property interests
against the public interests of safety and general welfare, the main differ-
ence between the two lines of cases lies in the interpretation of reason-
ableness. The courts in upholding the height zoning ordinances have stated
that the ordinances must provide for variance from the restriction upon
application to the local board, and for quasi-judicial hearings in case the
application is refused." On the other hand, in striking down the ordi-
nances as unconstitutional, the courts have stated that although airport
zoning is desirable, it may not be used to deprive the individual of his
constitutional rights." It is interesting to note, however, that in Harrell's
Candy Kitchen, Waring, and Baggett, the courts said that although the
o 160 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1963).
25 The courts base their reasoning on the premise that the public has a valid interest in adequate
air transportation.
2 At least nine jurisdictions have so held. See, e.g., Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S.
Av. 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948); Mutual Chem. Co. v. Baltimore, 1939 U.S. Av. 11 (Md. Cir. Ct.
1939); Yara Eng'r Co. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
a In Johnson v. Airport Authority of the City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426
(1962), the court gave the following definition of avigation easement: "Generally, an avigation
easement is an easement of right to the navigation of airspace over designated land and to the use
of land as an incident to air navigation."
24 See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Dutton v. Men-
docino County, supra note 22; Yara Eng'r Co. v. City of Newark, supra note 22; Gardner v. Alle-
gheny County, 393 Pa. 120, 142 A.2d 187 (1958). See also Note, 13 Hastings L.J. 397 (1962).
2a See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), holding that for a
zoning ordinance to be reasonable, it must bear a rational relation to public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare of the community. See also Welch v. Swasey, supra note 9; Model State Airport
Zoning Act § 6 (1944) prepared by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, United States Depart-
ment of Commerce, and NIMLO, Brief for Respondent, p. la, Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd.
Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
"5 See cases cited note 24 supra. See also Waring v. Peterson, supra note 19. AJthough upholding
the validity of the zoning ordinance, the court by way of dicta said that the ordinance might later
interfere with a specific use (i.e., height of a proposed building) and amount to a "taking."
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ordinances were constitutional, a situation that would amount to a "tak-
ing" could arise and thus require the payment of compensation. For
example, the court in Harrell's Candy Kitchen implied that if the orna-
mental roof had been a necessity rather than an ornament, the restriction
could have amounted to a "taking." In determining when a "taking"
occurs, a distinction has been made that where a private property right is
totally destroyed, zoning principles are usually applicable, but where the
right is taken from the individual and conferred on the public, eminent
domain principles are applicable."
In Jankovich, the Indiana Supreme Court, although declaring the ordi-
nance unconstitutional on both federal and state grounds, seemed to rely
heavily on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Causbys and Griggs v. Allegheny County." In effect, both of
these cases were inverse condemnation actions concerning repeated low
flights over the plaintiffs' lands."° The Court held that the low flights
constituted a "taking" of an avigation easement. In the instant case the
Indiana court reasoned that the ordinance in question had the same effect
on the plaintiff's property as the low flights in Causby and Griggs. It
constituted a "taking" of an easement over the property of the plaintiff."
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari because
the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court was supported by an independ-
ent and adequate state ground. However, Mr. Justice White said by way
of dicta: (1) that the Indiana Supreme Court decision was compatible
with the new amendment to the National Airport Plan in that although
zoning is one means of ensuring prevention of airport hazards, there are
also provisos in the Plan which allow for acquisition of avigation ease-
ments" and for acquisition of the fee to land where necessary to accom-
plish the purpose of prevention of obstructions; and (2) that the Indiana
decision did "not portend the wholesale invalidation of all airport zoning
laws,"" because the court could not negate the obvious legislative intent
of Congress in the recent amendment to the National Airport Act.4
Although the writ of certiorari was dismissed, the effect of this opinion
actually is likely to be an affirmance of the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance as applied to the Indiana Constitution.
The optimistic view taken by the majority in the dicta mentioned above
appears to be the law today. While a few state courts are broadening the
"
7 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
's328 U.S. 256 (1946).
29369 U.S. 84 (1962).
' For a concise discussion of the inverse condemnation procedure, see Note, 30 J. Air L. & Com.
287, 288 (1964).
3 See note 5 supra.
32 Form FAA-1624, sapra note 14, provides for the acquisition or retention of whatever inter-
ests in land that are necessary for the purpose of protection of both the general public and the
investment. The funds expended for such acquisition are among the "allowable project costs" for
which the sponsor may be reimbursed under the Federal Airport Act.
a3 379 U.S. at 493.
' The apparent intent of Congress in the recent amendment was to authorize the use of local
zoning ordinances where appropriate to insure the airport protection from obstructions. See note
15 supra.
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scope of zoning ordinances, most courts have been reluctant to step beyond
the limitations of strict public necessity in zoning where the property own-
er is left with some reasonable use of his land. It appears, however, that
even these limitations allow the taking of private property rights without
just compensation. For example, suppose a height restriction of fifty feet
is imposed upon a tract of land. Has not the owner less property rights in
his land than he had prior to the imposition of the restriction? The United
States Supreme Court has answered this by saying that one owns only the
airspace above his land which he may reasonably use.' However, even some
of that airspace may be taken without compensation under a reasonable
zoning ordinance so long as some reasonable use of the land is left to the
owner. Is taking a portion of a property owner's airspace, i.e., a property
right, different from taking only one acre out of a tract of many acres for
a public highway? If a restriction is imposed on the use of property,
and if the restriction results in measurable monetary damage to the
property owner, should he not be compensated for his loss even though
he is left with a reasonable use of his property? Certainly the property
is worth less on the market after the imposition of the restriction. It is
argued that the restriction is for a valid public purpose, hence public
necessity overrides any consideration of individual rights. The obvious an-
swer is that since the taking is for a public purpose, the public should bear
the burden of the loss. It is further argued that the public cannot afford to
acquire the necessary land interests by paying for them. For example, in
the airport situations, the acquisition of the fee to, or easements over, suf-
ficient land to meet federal standards for receipt of federal aid would be
economically unfeasible in most cases, if not fatally overburdensome. The
mere advancement of these arguments recognizes that there is a loss, but
the letter and the spirit of the United States Constitution forbid the taking
of private property rights by any governmental body without payment of
just compensation. There is no objection to either the validity or the de-
sirability of zoning, but it is submitted that if through zoning restrictions
a property owner incurs an economic loss which can be proved in court, the
burden of the loss should be shouldered by the public, rather than by the
individual.
Daniel L. Penner
s' United States v. Causby, supra note 28.
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Because of the loss of a government contract Aaxico Air Lines fur-
loughed its pilots, all of whom were members of the complaining Air
Line Pilots Association. Aaxico notified the union that it considered their
previous collective bargaining agreement to be terminated. The union
replied that the agreement was merely dormant and that it still expected
to deal with the company upon resumption of services. Later, Aaxico was
awarded a government contract, but did not reinstate the ALPA pilots.
The union filed suit for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
asserting that Aaxico had failed to comply with the notice and bargaining
requirements of the Railway Labor Act' in changing the working condi-
tions of the pilots. The trial court issued an injunction restoring the wages
and conditions which prevailed before the changes were made, and ordered
the parties to establish a system board of adjustment to decide any dis-
putes regarding compliance with the court order. Held, reversed: the
controversy was a "minor" dispute and, therefore, beyond the competence
of the trial court since the question of termination of the collective bar-
gaining agreement could only be decided by interpreting the agreement
itself, which, under the Railway Labor Act, is a function of the boards of
adjustment. Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 331 F.2d 433
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964).
The Railway Labor Act, enacted in 1926, was amended in 1936 to
include common air carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The purpose
of the act was to provide means for the prompt settlement of disputes
between a carrier, or a group of carriers, and their employees. Through
its plenary power over interstate commerce, Congress sought to avoid
interruptions of service resulting from strikes that might develop from
such disputes. Section 203 of title II of the act' created the National
Mediation Board which handles disputes concerning changes in rates of
'44 Stat. 587 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1964).
'Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 26 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1928).
a Railway Labor Act, § 203, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 183 (1964):
§ 183 Disputes within jurisdiction of Mediation Board
The parties or either party to a dispute between an employee or 'a group of em-
ployees and a carrier or carriers by air may invoke the services of the National
Mediation Board and the jurisdiction of said Mediation Board is extended to any of
the following cases:
(a) A dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not
adjusted by the parties in conference.
(b) Any other dispute not referable to 'an adjustment board, as hereinafter pro-
vided, and not adjusted in conference between the parties, or where conferences are
refused.
The National Mediation Board may proffer its services in case any labor emergency
is found by it to exist at any time.
The services of the Mediation Board may be invoked in a case under sections 181-
188 of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as are the disputes covered
by section 155 of this title.
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pay, rules, or working conditions not covered in a bargaining agreement.
In this type of dispute, labeled "major" by the case law, the federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Mediation Board." The notice pro-
visions of section 6 of title V must be adhered to before the authority of
the Mediation Board may be invoked. It is important to note that the
language of section 203 is merely permissive-the parties "may invoke"
the jurisdiction of the Mediation Board. In most cases under section 203
one of the parties will bring suit in a federal district court for relief,
usually in the form of an injunction to maintain the status quo or a
declaratory judgment. If the court fails to rule on the merits, the parties
will then carry the controversy to the bargaining table or the Mediation
Board. Section 204 of title II' requires that grievances over the interpre-
tation of bargaining agreements be decided by regional boards of ad-'
justment. The act is not permissive with respect to this type of contro-
versy-it "shall be handled" by the adjustment board. Disputes within
the purview of this section have been labeled "minor." The regional boards'
awards are final and binding on the parties except with respect to a
money judgment, and are enforceable in the federal district courts.! The
United States Supreme Court has held' that the boards of adjustment
have exclusive primary jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising out of in-
terpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements as a "con-
4 Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
'Railway Labor Act, § 6, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964) provides in pertinent
part:
§ 156 Procedures in changing rates of pay, rules, and working conditions
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written
notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the
representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon
within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the
thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended
change has been given, . . . rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be
altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required
by section 155 of this title.
Section 205, tit. II, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) gives the National Mediation
Board the power at its discretion to create the National Air Transport Adjustment Board. However,
as of this writing such a National Board has not been established.
" Railway Labor Act, § 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. 5 184 (1964) provides in pertinent
part:
184 System, group, or regional boards of adjustment
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers
by air growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agree-
ments concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending
and unadjusted on April 10, 1936 before the National Labor Relations Board, shall
be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of
the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in
this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition' of the parties or by either
party to an appropriate adjustment board, as hereinafter provided, with a full state-
ment of the facts and supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees, acting through their
representatives, selected in accordance with the provisions of sections 181-188 of
this title, to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdiction not exceeding the juris-
diction which may be lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional boards of
adjustment, under the authority of section 153 of this title.
'Railway Labor Act S 3, tit. I, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (m), (p) (1964).
'Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950).
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gressionally designated agency peculiarly competent in this field."' The
importance of the classification of the dispute as either "major" or "minor"
is that it determines the forum and type of relief available to the parties.
In Elgin, J. & E.R.R. v. Burley,0 the leading case in this area, the
Supreme Court held that an order by a railway adjustment board in
settlement of a dispute arising out of grievances or out of the interpreta-
tion of a collective labor agreement was more than an advisory opinion
and precluded judicial review. The importance of the case lies in Mr.
Justice Rutledge's discussion of the differences between the two classes of
controversy under the act. The court concluded that a "major" dispute
involves controversies over the "formation of collective agreements or
efforts to secure them."" A "pure" major dispute exists when there is no
such agreement, and, therefore, the issue is not whether an existing agree-
ment controls the controversy. Disputes over changes in the terms of an
existing contract are major if the parties look to the acquisition of rights
for the future, and not to the assertion of rights claimed to have vested
in the past. A "minor" dispute, the court reasoned, presupposes the exist-
ence of a collective agreement and a controversy as to either the meaning
or proper application of a specific section. This type of issue involves a
situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in
terms, but the claim is to "rights accrued" in the agreement.
1
The Burley distinction seems simple in theory, but as a practical matter
the differences are difficult to define when applied to a fact situation. The
issue before a court making such an application is whether the contro-
versy in question requires an interpretation as to "rights accrued" or
"new rights created." Generally when the courts have been forced to re-
fer to the bargaining agreement in order to reach their decisions, they
have classified a controversy "minor.' However, the District of Colum-
'But see Milstead v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 273 Ala. 557, 142 So.2d 705 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 892 (1963), which held that in an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement,
the Railway Labor Act was not intended to confer exclusive primary jurisdiction when the dispute
was between the employee and their bargaining representatives. See also Note, 1 Ala. L. Rev. 626
(1963).
'0 32 5 U.S. 711 (1945).
"I d. at 723.
12 Ibid.
" See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 326 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1963) in which the court held that the union's claims that management had unilaterally cancelled
earned vacations and extended the work week in order to eliminate the union as a sole bargaining
agent involved a minor dispute; Flight Engineers' Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5
(5th Cir. 1962) where the court held that questions presented as to interpretation of supple-
mental agreements to labor contracts and right of the union to compel bargaining thereunder
were minor disputes; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northwest Airlines,. Inc., 304 F.2d 206
(8th Cir. 1962) in which the court held that the airline's claim that maintenance employees were
obliged to cross fellow employees' picket lines involves a minor dispute; Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1959) where the court found
that a dispute involving changing terminals in a class of service and abolishing a number of
positions was minor.
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bia 4 and Second Circuits' classified disputes "major" despite the necessity
of "interpreting" the existing agreements. In Manning v. American Air-
lines, Inc.'" the carrier discontinued the check-off of dues with the union.
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, interpreted the
union check-off agreements to be within the phrase "working conditions"
under Section 203 of the Railway Labor Act." Although the term "major"
dispute was not mentioned, the court rejected American's claim of ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the board of adjustment. In Southern R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen," the District of Columbia Circuit
likewise found the dispute to be "major" since the carrier's action involved
a change in the long-standing interpretation which the parties had given
the agreement. The court reasoned that to allow a unilateral change in the
construction of the contract would in substance and effect change the
agreement itself.'" Thus, it is explicit in Southern and implicit in Man-
ning that the courts may consider the construction of the agreement in
order to classify a dispute "major" or "minor."
In Aaxico ° the Fifth Circuit, recognizing the Burley distinction, con-
sidered the controlling issue to be whether the agreement between Aaxico
and ALPA was still in effect. If there was no agreement applicable to the
issue in controversy, obviously a "major" dispute existed, and the court
would have had concurrent jurisdiction. The union's argument and the
district court's position was that the trial court had authority to con-
strue the agreement to discover if the contract was still operative. How-
ever, the court of appeals concluded that it was beyond the competence
of the trial court to interpret the bargaining contract. The court followed
its earlier decision in St. Louis, S.F. &. Tex. Ry. v. Railway Yardmasters."
In Yardmasters the carrier gave notice of the abolishment of all the yard-
master positions at the Ft. Worth yards and of the transfer of the duties
of that classification to other employees. Reversing the district court, the
Fifth Circuit classified the dispute "minor" because the lower court had
construed the language of the existing agreement." In the present case,
4Southern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The D.C. Circuit held that the district court properly enjoined any effort by the carrier to effect
changes in working conditions under its contract of operating all locomotives with firemen present
in the cab, and properly forbade change in long-standing interpretations which had been given
by the parties to the existing contract. The carrier had decided to do away with the fireman posi-
tion on the diesels.




7 Id. at 34-35.
337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"°Id. at 132.
2°331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964).
2' 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964). The district court in Yard-
masters, 218 F. Supp. 193, 206 (N.D. Tex. 1963), holding the dispute to be major stated:
It is an action that will change working conditions as they are contemplated by
the agreement. If the plan continues, it will terminate that agreement by destroying
the subject matter thereof. It is only reasonable that the union will use every legal
means to keep from losing the contract by planned erosion; That kind of issue does
not meet the test of a minor dispute. ..
The court of appeals reversed, holding the dispute to be minor.
22 328 F.2d at 753.
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Judge Tuttle reasoned that the uniform holdings of the case law required
the use of the grievance procedures of the boards of adjustment to re-
solve the contract interpretation. 3 Aaxico stands strong in favor of the
exhaustion of the administrative remedies of the disputing parties. It is
clear that the court is demanding that these disputes be decided by the
terms of the Railway Labor Act where the expertise of the boards of ad-
justment can be utilized. The court also held that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to decide whether the pay requirements under the con-
tract were violated by the company's changes.
Although in Aaxico and Yardmasters the causes were remanded to the
boards of adjustment, this does not mean that the Fifth Circuit is adverse
to holding a controversy "major." In fact, in a recent case the court did
just that and in doing so put the earlier cases into their proper perspective.
In Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,' the
court rejected the carrier's contention that this was a "minor" dispute and
that the only complaint of the union was that the agreement was not
being complied with. In classifying the dispute as "major," the court dis-
tinguished Aaxico: 5
This is not a case like ...Aaxico involving a dispute as to whether the
agreement authorizes action taken by the Carrier. Neither is it a case in-
volving a dispute over the meaning of the terms relating to the rates of pay,
hours, and working conditions. Rather, this is a case in which a Carrier has
unilaterally instituted wholesale changes in these terms, changes which, in
the negotiations presently going on with respect to the September 25 notice,
it seeks to establish permanently.
The distinctions between the types of controversy become more under-
standable in the light of the three recent Fifth Circuit cases. In Yard-
masters there was a provision in the agreement for the abolishment of the
yardmaster positions and since the grievance was over the interpretation of
this section the dispute was properly a "minor" one. Likewise, the decision
in Aaxico was justified since the real issue there was whether the agreement
required the carrier to rehire the union pilots. The union's position that
the court had jurisdiction to construe the contract to determine its exist-
ence or non-existence was untenable in view of its other contention that
the agreement was a continuous one which was violated by the carrier.
The carrier's denial of coverage and refusal to rehire the pilots might
appear to be a material change in the working conditions and, therefore,
within the ambit of section 6. However, the court stressed that to be a
*'major" dispute the claim must be to new rights created for the future
as in Florida East Coast rather than to rights already accrued.
2333 1 F.2d at 437.
24336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964). The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's preliminary in-
junction preventing the carrier from operating under conditions different from those contained
in the agreement. Notice by the carrier to cancel the union ship provision of the agreement and
to change the pay, rules, and working conditions under the contract brought on a strike between
the parties. The court concluded that the controversies were "major" and that it was within
the jurisdiction of the trial judge to pass on which changes were necessary for the carrier to
continue to operate.
25 Id. at 178-79.
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The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Burley distinction between
"major" and "minor" disputes in Aaxico and the other Fifth Circuit cases
is helpful in clarifying this area of the law. Although the District of
Columbia and Second Circuits are in seeming conflict in Manning and
Southern, the Fifth Circuit cases are more explicit and direct in their
analysis of the problem. At the same time, the court can be criticized for
its failure to support its decision with policy reasons or justifications by
virtue of the purposes of the Railway Labor Act. Unfortunately, the
denial of certiorari in Aaxico and Manning offers no guidelines from the
Supreme Court. Since the boards of adjustment are powerless to issue in-
junctions, the most serious consequence of the decision is the preclusion
of the court from using its injunctive powers to maintain the status quo
until the dispute can be resolved.
George W. Bramblett, Jr.
